change has passed witb far less comment. This was the change brought about by the attacks on metaphysics which are associated with the names of Hume and Kant, and less directly with Descartes and Locke. Traditionally, ethics, including political ethics, have been based upon metaphysics; what is good bas meant what is good/or human beings, and this has rested upon an answer to the question of what a human being is-a question metaphysical in nature which, since Hume and Kant, many have refused to ask. Such a refusal need have no immediate effect on the ethical principles held-Kant continued to hold the morals, if not the faith, of his fatbers; Hume was a gentleman and a Tory-but it makes a great difference to the way in which they are held, and the way in which they are thought about. Good and bad lie either in the nature of things, or in the personal preference of each individual; and the two are poles apart. And those who became sceptical of any knowledge about the nature of thingsmetaphysics-were driven inexorably on to the other horn of tbe dilemma, on to the ethics of taste. And, unless tastes in ethics can be shown to be uniform between individuals-as clearly they are not-then ethical questions are scarcely worth asking, since the statement "X is good" means nothing more than "I like X." There are those, to be sure, who attempt to avoid this awkward conclusion. T. D. Weldon, in The Vocabulary of Politics,' held that ethics are a matter of taste, indeed, but that some people have better taste than others, as in matters of art. This latter may be so; there is nothing absurd about it. But it is hardly very useful as it stands. How can these ethical aristocrats be recognized? How can we tell that their taste in morals is better than ours, unless by some surreptitious appeal to the nature of things, to external reality-a metaphysical appeal? A pure taste-ethic, if indeed it exists, must be individual, incommunicable, and ethical disagreements must be incapable of being resolved. For any attempt to go beyond personal taste as the basis of morality, any attempt to give reasons for ethical values, involves an invasion of the forbidden land of metaphysics. There can be no communication, for there is no common ground on which ethical discussion can take place; this is the end of "nonmetaphysical ethics," if that position is accepted.
If it is accepted; for it may reasonably be asked whether the denial of the metaphysical basis of ethics is not often a verbal thing, "notional" rather than "real," as Newman would have said. Earl Russell, a 'latter-day' Hume in this respect, tells us that his ethics are non-metaphysical. 4 Is he, then, asking us to accept the ethical judgements he makes so frequently, on the basis of his personal preferences? Does he not rather imply by every word he writes in support of his judgements, that the things which he condemns are wrong in themselves, in the very nature of things, and not merely that he personally fmds them disgusting? And if this latter is all that he is asserting, then he has no defence against the rejoinder "So what?" His system could be useful for condemning his own moral shortcomings; but it is without any basis for condemning the moral shortcomings of another person. T. D. Weldon heads a chapter with this quotation from Hume:
When you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a sentiment or feeling of blame from the contemplation of it. Ii Bnt I doubt very much whether this is what a man means when he makes a moral judgement. The scope of a moral judgement is wider than this. When Earl Russell condemns preparations for nnclear war, he surely means more than that he has "a sentiment or feeling of blame from the contemplation of it"; he surely means that we, his readers, ought to have similar sentiments and feelings, and Mr. Kennedy too-and this as a matter of the deepest and strictest moral obligation.
Ifhe did not mean this, then he would have no business arguing in support of his moral judgements. A pure taste-ethic can lead a man to state his preference in a particular case, but there he must stop. He must not attempt to back up his preference by argument. For every argument is, implicitly, an appeal beyond the individual, an appeal to external reality. It implies that there exists an external reality to appeal to. It would be pointless to construct an edifIce of rational argument on top of an irrational personal preference. The foundation would not support the building; the starting point would still be, "Well, I just prefer it that way." If, for example, some non-metaphysical moralist urges us to respect human beings, does he not imply that there is something about a human beingyes, something in human nature-which is valuable, which demands respect?
Thus it is that the metaphysical foundations of ethics, rather too ostentatiously thrown out of the window, may be smuggled in again through the back door; but in a much less manageable form, for, since their existence is no longer admitted, they may not be discussed, and discussion is reduced to an exchange of personal preferences. Within the limits of "non-metaphysical ethics" there is no higher court of a ppeal where these preferences may be resolved. And since there is no higher court, the individual may, according to his humour, hold to his personal preferences not less rigidly, but more. It is a characteristic of "non-meraphysical ethics" that moral positions which are proclaimed to be relative may be held with a very un-relative tenacity, which is not at all mitigated by the frequency with which they are changed. Earl Russell may serve again as an example. The metaphysicians-Jacques Marirain, for instance-are steadier, but more qualified, in their judgements.
II
Lord Acton was a writer whose work cannot fail to appeal to those who seek clear-cut ethical judgements in the political sphere.' But the resounding dicra for which he is remembered were not characteristic of every stage of his development. Acton reversed the stereotype of a fiery youth and a sober middle age, for his unqualified judgements date from the period of his maturity, while it was the young Acton who was capable of subtle discourse on ethics in public life.
Typical of his earlier approach was his treatment of slavery and serfdom, where, far from condemning those institutions out of hand, he first set out in some derail the conditions under which servitude can be morally acceprable:
An institution, so universal and apparently inevitable. cannot be treated as simply an evil or a wrong. Helplessness or childishness is contemptible only in a grown-up man, and slavery is criminal only when it is artificial. ' Further, A slave may be exposed to great pains and great dangers; but ifhis position is so regulated by law that nothing actually immoral. such as the refusal of education or the severance of the marriage-tie, is permitted, he still in a certain sphere. enjoys a restricted freedom. 8 Slavery is, he believed, a srage through which all peoples must pass on their way to civilization, and he held that there is nothing wrong with this srage in itself; that on the contrary, it has been "a mighty instrument not for evil only, but for good in the providential order of the world.'" These conditions he postulated if slavery were to be legitimate. Did American slavery in the r860's, when he wrote, meet these conditions? It did not. He seems not to have accepted the doctrine, newly current in the "infidel science of Europe," of the essential inferiority of the negroes, which would have made slavery, in his (and Aristotle's) terms, their "natural" condition.'" Further, he wrote, the surrounding conditions of American slavery were of themselves immoral, for they denied to the slave the dignity of a human being; he could not, Acton declared, make a valid contract, not even the contract of marriage. n So it was that only after a long and closely reasoned argument he reached the conclusion that American slavery was an evil.
He approached in the same way the question of the steps which ought to be taken to remove this evil. It was necessary, he wrote, to proceed prudently, "lest in healing the evils offorced but certain labour, they should produce incurable evils of another kind." But in the United States, emancipation was "an act of war, not of statesmanship or humanity ... which has not protected the white man from the vengeance of barbarians nor the black from the pitiless cruelty of a selfish civilization,"" and he condemned the "abstract, ideal absolutism" of the northern Abolitionists, in whose minds "all constitutional questions are referred to the one fundamental principle, without consideration of policy or expediency."" It was thus that the young Acton could approach a question of political principle: concerned to state moral principles as he understood them, but concerned also to exercise prudent thought in their application, lest cures be effected at the price of worse ills. This may be contrasted with his approach to another question two decades later, the question of the disestablishment of the (Protestant) Church of Ireland. Writing to Mary, daughter ofW. E. Gladstone, Acton revealed something ofhis own mind in the words which he put into the mouth of Cardinal Newman, who opposed disestablishment:
You cannot be sure that this policy will succeed in Ireland; you are persuaded that it will grievously injure political life in England. What else have you to go upon?14
Newman's position l ' seems to have been that, while it is not permissible to do direct evil in politics, even to achieve a good end, one may tolerate the continuation of an evil already in existence; and that, if the immediate steps to rectify an evil seem likely to succeed only at the price of worse evils, it may not even be morally permissible to take those immediate steps. But whether this represents Newman's position exactly is immaterial, for Acton was citing him as an example, an example of an approach which the mature Acton had come to regard as "sophistry," one of his favourite pejorative words. More generally, he observed that tbe great bulk of cultured men in our day do not believe that politics are a branch of Moral Science . . . they would say .. . we must consider consequences, balance probabilities, estimate forces, choose the lesser evil .... Thus Maine, Stephen, Dilke, all mcn who live in diplomacy, all men concerned with India, all men belonging to the services. IS By this time, Acton had come to believe that only two positions were possible on the relation of ethics to politics: either one must apply moral principles directly, without "considering consequences" or "choosing the lesser evil"; or one must separate "politics" from "Moral Science" as completely as Machiavelli did. Twenty years previously he himself had accepted a third position, but his later rejection of it was so complete that Lionel Kochan has gone so far as to aver that politics and ethics were quite distinct in Acton's earlier writings, becoming united around r868. Before that, Acton, "in sympathy with Burke ... was obliged to separate the political world from abstract questions of right and wrong, morality and immorality, etc."11 Now whether Edmund Burke wonld have made such a separation is highly disputable, and has been disputed with some success by Francis P. Canavan in The Political Reason ~r Edmund Burke. l8 It is equally disputable when applied to Acton, even to the young Acton. All that Kochan has managed to demonstrate is that the young Acton was disposed to give some consideration to consequences in judgements of right and wrong in politics, and that the later Acton was not; and when he states that the former position amounted to claiming "the autonomy of politics"" from ethics, he shows that, like the later Acton himself, he recognizes only two standpoints, Machiavellianism and rule-book moralism, on the relation of politics and ethics.
Acton was persuaded that Machiavellianism, the complete separation of ethical from political considerations, was the enemy, on no account to be compromised with; and he drew the limits of compromise very widely indeed. His introduction to L. A. Burd's edition of The Prince showed a detailed knowledge of Machiavelli and Machiavellianism, the fruit of an interest in the Florentine which amounted almost to fascination, and he referred in many other places to the writer who "first reduced to a code the wickedness of public men." He drew attention to the exceptionally stringent condemnation of Machiavelli's writings by the Church:
When the Index was instituted, in ISS7 . Machiavelli was one of the first writers condemned, and he was more rigorously and implacably condemned than anybody else ... . He continued to be specially excepted when permission was given to read forbidden books . .. when Lucchesini preached against him at the GeStI, he had to apply to the Pope himself for licence to read him.
Acton cited, from the history of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, examples of political villainy in theory and practice, and pointed out that such unpleasanmess was inevitable once politics and ethics had been divorced. He listed a spate of writers who had followed Machiavelli in maintaining that "success" is the only standard applicable to politics. Acton preceded Leo Strauss in gauging Machiavelli's influence by the fact that he has ceased to shock-"the authentic interpreter of Machiavelli ... is the whole oflater history" -and he quoted in English, French, German, and Italian from the writings of men who had contributed to the rehabilitation of Machiavelli, to the ascending scale of praise. He was simply a faithful observer affaces . ... He discovered tbe true line of progress and the law of future society; he was a patriot. a republican. a Liberal. but, above all, a man sagacious enough to know that politics are an inductive science. 20 So wrote the nineteenth century Machiavellians. For to Acton, the golden age of Machiavellianism was his own.
To this flood-tide of Machiavellianism Acton opposed his own severe notion of ethics. The first interest of his mature years was villainy, past and present, and he always managed to find plenty of it, including some that was not there. 21 Maitland's impression was that Acton was regarded at Cambridge as "a sort of Dictionary of Dates with a leaning to scandaL "22 Acton himself wrote to Creighton denying "that Christianity is a mere system of metaphysics which borrowed some ethics from elsewhere. It is rather a system of ethics which borrowed its metaphysics elsewhere."" To find a well-instructed Catholic maintaining that his religion is either of these alternatives, is very strange indeed. But to Acton, ethics came first, and he specifically rejected the idea that Christianity is "chiefly for relations to God";" not an uncommon idea among Catholics. The primacy of ethics in his thought left its mark on all his later historical work:
It might be true to say that in Lord Acton, the whig historian reached his highest consciousness; and it is true, and at the same time it is not a mere coincidence, that in his writings moral judgments appeared in their most trenchant and uncompromising form, while in his whole estimate ofche subject the moral function of history was most greatly magnified. 25 "Moral judgments appeared in their most trenchant and uncompromising form." It is for these that Acton is best remembered. "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely," runs the much-quoted Actonian dictum, and the corruption, it is clear, is moral; a corruption to which he believed the rulers of his Church to be almost peculiarly subject. 26 ill What was the source of Acton's morality? It might be expected that, as a Catholic, his ethics would be those of the Catholic Church, and early in his career he wrote that he was seeking "a philosophy of politics to be derived from the principles of Catholicism on the one hand and from the principles of our constitution on the other."27 But Herbert Butterfield has remarked how little the Catholic religion had to do with the ethics to which he attached so much importance:
One may gather from his statements in this connection that he regarded this side of his thought as the consequence of his Catholicism; but one may question his self-analysis at this point. for it is difficult to see that either the actual content of his moral code (as it can be inferred from what might be called his judicial decisions), or the particular way in which he applied his principles to any case that was under consideration, could be regarded as representing a system that was specifically Catholic or Chrisrian. 28 To Actou, "the fmal judgment depends on the worst action," just as , in a criminal trial, the accused man's virtuous past life is not allowed to weigh against the single crime for which he has been arraigned. 29 It is an attitude particularly un-Catholic that includes no notion of repentance; there is no place here for a Good Thief. Again, he made no distinction between objective and subjective guilt. To him, a wicked act implied a wicked agent, and no extenuating circumstances-strong feelings, or a mistaken notion of duty-ought to be considered. To conceive of "crime without a culprit, the unavenged victim who perished through no man's fault, law without responsibility, the virtuous agent of a vicious cause,"" seemed to Acton the height of absurdity, and here, too, Actonian ethics and Catholic ethics can be seen to be at odds, for to the latter, such paradoxes as he mentioned would not be foreign. And in the third place, Catholic moralists are far more hesitant than Acton in applying moral principles in the political sphere; and to them, the consideration of consequences and the choosing of the lesser evil is an essential part of one's moral duty, and not, as with Acton, an evasion of it. The attitude of a Maritain, who holds that "politics is a branch of ethics, but a branch specifically distinct from other branches of the same stem," and that the application of moral principles to politics is very difficult, "a dark night full of snares"" is very different from Acton's more confident approach.
None the less, he maintained that there is a connection between ethics and religion; "Deny God," he wrote, "and whole branches of deeper morality lose tbeir sanction. "32 But, aware that there did exist men who denied God, and concerned lest morality, including political morality, should deteriorate in its turn, he looked for an ethic acceptable to unbelievers. This was the reason for his intense interest in the novelist George Eliot." His interest was not primarily literary, though he admired the literary merit of her work rather more highly than would one who was interested in that alone; it was ethical. For the novelist, an unbeliever, preached through her novels a lofty system of ethics, and this, to a man so deeply concerned for the cracking of moral standards and the subsidence of their religious foundations, made her seem, perhaps, a brighter light than she was. For she can hardly be said to have built her own ethical system; rather, she inherited it, and was living on the ethical capital of a religion that she had ceased to accept.
Were his ethics, then, those of the Whig historian? Gertrude Himmelfarb has told us that "from a variety of texts Acton gleaned the one moral precept: means are not justified by their ends,"" but it is hard to see how this admirable but not very original precept, or any other precept, can be gleaned from historical texts by any method other than the one which Acton specifically repudiated: the test of "success." As Butterfield has remarked, The eliciting of general truths or of propositions claiming universal validity is the one kind of consummation which it is beyond the competence of history to achieve. 35 And it seems more likely that Acton took his moral measures to rather than from history.
Acton looked at questions of guilt with the eyes of a rationalist; if a man might he presumed to know what is right, any deviation from the straight and narrow was enough to condemn him. Hence his refusal to recognize the possibility that a high degree of objective guilt in an action may not necessarily imply an equally high degree of subjective guilt iu the agent. The rather unreasonable expectation that people will always act reasonably makes for a sharper judgement on them when they fail, makes for a severer morality. Acton's morality was severe from his youth; E. L. Woodward has noted 36 that he showed a tendency toward "overdefmite" and "over-polemical" judgements in his teens while studying under Dollinger at Munich. Such a tendency is not unusual in a young man, but maturity, far from mellowing Acton's judgements, sharpened them, to the point where R. A. L. Smith can write of Acton's "moral fanaticism," adding, "for I can usc no word less stroug." Smith attributed this quality to Acton's solitariness: Lord Acton's moral fanaticism surely admits ofa simple psychological explanation. It wa the external manifestation of his intense loneliness and sense of isolation: the shield an< breastplate of a man who had no contemporaries. 37 "I never had any contemporaries;" the comment was Acton's own, 3: and points to what must be the most noticeable, and probably the mOSI influential aspect of his life. David Mathew has remarked on the "some· times startling loneliness" of Acton's childhood, and E. L. W oodwarc has pointed out how little he associated with other students while he w", at Munich" His religion, which had excluded him from the company 01 his peers at Cambridge, served also to separate him from the Englisl: country gentry, while the attitudes which he adopted toward that religior separated him in some measure from his co-religionists. Important also w", his lack of contact with the English historians of his day, initially th, result of his exclusion from Cambridge and of his training in a different school, and from the heights ofbis German training he looked down upon contemporary English bistorians and found tbem "unscientific"; a bad estimate, according to E. L. Woodward." Having no social contact wit!: them, Acton could the more readily stand back and bombard them in print. With Froude he carried on a long academic vendetta. S. R. Gardiner he accused, with little justice and as little politeness, of preaching the debased ethics of "success." Their moral judgements: these, primary in Acton's mind, became the bone of contention whenever be read other men's work, for he seldom agreed with tbem. It was in sucb a case that tbe historian Creighton received from Acton a review of wbich he complained:
[Acton] sends me a review which reads to me like the utterances of a man who is in :I furious passion. bue is incapable of clear expression ... he hints and sneers and divagate~ in a manner which seems to me ill-natured. 41 From tbis isolation, English historical scholarship on the one hand and Acton's own halance and development on the other, were sufferers. He saw bimself as standing alone, defending tbe moral code against Machiavelli, Disraeli, tbe whole body of English historians, and even tbe ecclesiastical leaders of the Catholic Church, living and dead. "I am absolutely alone in my essential ethical position," he wrote, and he seems not to have entertained any doubt that his position, contra l1IundulIl, was the correct one.
Politics comes nearer religion with me, a party is more like a church, error is more like heresy, prejudice more like sin, than I find it to be with better men.4I2
It is not good for man to be alone, even moral man. Acton came to hold, then, that there were only two possible positions on the relation of ethics to politics, Machiavellianism, or the complete autonomy of politics from ethical standards, and his own position, the application to political questions of a few simple rules of individual ethics. Any other position-that the political sphere may have a few moral rules of its own, or that a ruler, as a ruler, may be bound to do some things which he would be bound as an individual to avoid-was not to him a legitimate third position at all, but was "sophistry," Machiavellianism in another guise, even though he had formerly held such a position himself Thus his stand on the relation of ethics and politics is opposed by two groups-to be sure, they were all one to Acton, but they are so far apart that they must be distinguished-the Machiavellians and the casnists. The Machiavellians deny his contention that ethical principles can be applied to politics at all; the casuists, who may hold ethical principles as absolute as Acton's own, deny none the less that these principles contain in themselves a clear answer to every case that arises. For that is what casuistry means: the application of general moral principles to particular cases. And it can only be regretted that a man who was so concerned with the application of moral principles in public life should have been so little concerned with the very difficult task of making that application. The Machiavellian, who holds that innocence is irrelevant, he rejected; but when the casuist, who would also oppose the Machiavellian, goes on to ask, with D. W. Brogan, "Is innocence enough?" Acton replies that it is enough.
Many people agree with him. And thus it is that some of his commentators are prepared to accept Acton at his own valuation, to see him, as he saw himself, in the armour of a Horatius defending against fearful odds the ethical bridge into the political realm. To Gertrude Himmelfarb, Acton was not merely alone, but alone in the right: "Acton alone took seriously the problem of liberty and morality," and "it was demoralizing to discover that the precepts of morality could be so casually relaxed."" The hard labour of those who would apply perfect principles to an imperfect world, and must perforce apply them imperfectly, wins no recognition from her, as it won none from Acton. These people should be called upon to demonstrate, rather than taking for granted, their contention that prudence is not, as Aristotle said it was, a virtue, but a vice, and that the only moral man is the one who says Fiatjustida, even though, when the heavens have fallen, the last state is more unjust than the first.
